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ESTABLISHING RUSSIA’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER-CRIME BASED ON 
ITS HACKER CULTURE 	
Trevor McDougal* 
 
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 	
Russia has established a lackadaisical approach to both intellectual 
property rights and cyber-crime enforcement, particularly the relatively 
open nature of markets that sell unlicensed copies of software, movies, 
and music within the country1 as well as the spread of cyber-crime 
seemingly originating from within the Russian Federation that causes 
harm in other nations, 2  including the data breach at Target in 
2013.3 These issues call into question the legal obligations Russia has in 
preventing its citizens from causing disruptions outside its borders or in 
limiting the damages they cause. These obligations are often complicated 																																								 																					
* Juris Doctor candidate, 2016, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
1 See Ryan O’Connell, MPAA Names Top Online Sites Pirating Movies – Russia, You’re First, 
THEWRAP: COVERING HOLLYWOOD (Oct. 27, 2014, 11:05 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/mpaa-
names-top-online-sites-pirating-movies-russia-150500636.html (noting that the MPAA has 
identified Russian sites—both direct download and peer to peer—as being the worst online 
offenders); Erik Gruenwedel, MPAA Reveals ”World’s Most Notorious” DVD Piracy Markets, 
HOME MEDIA MAGAZINE (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.homemediamagazine.com/piracy/mpaa-
reveals-worlds-most-notorious-dvd-piracy-markets-34466 (describing the Motion Picture 
Association of America’s listing of the worst physical distributors of pirated content, which included 
physical markets such as Mutino Market in Moscow where titles can be made to order, allowing a 
purchaser to select a movie after which the DVD is created on nearby premises). 
2 See Lukas I. Alpert, Cyber Attack Thought to Originate in Russia, WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG 
(Mar. 28, 2013, 7:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/03/28/cyber-attack-thought-to-originate-
in-russia/ (noting that an attack targeting a spam-fighting group “appears to have been launched by a 
gang of hackers from Russia”); Larry Barrett, Russia, Brazil Lead Cyber Attack Barrage, 
ESECURITYPLANET (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.php/3858971/Russia-Brazil-Lead-Cyber-Attack-
Barrage.htm  (noting that more cyber attacks originated from Russia than from any other country 
during the third quarter of 2009); Jessica Guynn & Kevin Johnson, Is Russia Tied to JPMorgan 
Hacking?, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2014, 4:03 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/08/28/russia-jpmorgan-hacking-attack/14735649/ 
(questioning whether Russia is tied to a JPMorgan hacking incident in retaliation for the sanctions 
imposed against Russia); Ionut Ilascu, United States Targeted by Cyber Attacks Originating from 
China, the US, India, and Russia, SOFTPEDIA (Aug. 25, 2014, 09:51 AM), 
http://news.softpedia.com/news/United-States-Targeted-by-Cyber-Attacks-Originating-from-China-
the-US-India-and-Russia-456235.shtml (noting that between April and September 2013, nine 
percent of the machines involved in cyber attacks against the United States and forty percent of the 
machines involved in cyber attacks against Europe were located in Russia, but that “this does not 
mean that the attackers were in [Russia], only that they used systems in this country”); Nicole 
Perlroth, Online Security Experts Link More Breaches to Russian Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/29/technology/russian-government-linked-to-more-
cybersecurity-breaches.html?_r=0 (noting that while security experts link attacks to the government, 
there is no direct evidence of involvement). 
3 See Andrew Webster, Massive Target Data Breach May Have Been Caused by a Russian 
Teenager, THE VERGE (Jan. 18, 2014, 12:59 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/18/5322276/target-data-breach-malware-author (noting that the 
data breach “may have been caused” by a Russian national); Home Depot Confirms Data Breach, 
Hit by Same Malware as Target, RT.COM (Sept. 9, 2014, 10:12 AM), http://rt.com/usa/186224-
home-depot-data-breach/ (noting the presence of Russian words inside the code for the virus). 
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by the circuitous path from the creator of a potential attack to the actual 
perpetrators of that attack, and then ultimately to the victims of the 
attack.4 
In addition to the question concerning the degree of control 
necessary to attribute the actions of groups within a State to the State 
itself, other questions loom in the background—does a State have any 
obligation to control the actions of its private citizens that act outside of 
its design or even contrary to its wishes? That is, even if a State is not 
actively helping its citizens perpetrate cyber attacks, does it have an 
obligation to prevent them from doing so? Can a State be held 
responsible for not taking sufficient steps to prevent its citizens from 
attacking governments or businesses in other countries? Because of 
Russia’s history of tacit acceptance of hackers and its lack of 
enforcement of its own laws against citizens when they cause damage 
outside the State, Russia should be held responsible for the actions of 
private citizens acting within its borders when those citizens engage in 
attacks that have an impact outside of the its boundaries. 
Part II of this Comment examines the historical development of a 
hacker culture in Russia. In this culture, domestic violations of 
intellectual property rights are rarely enforced and hacking of 
international groups is rarely punished. Part II analyzes how the 
government’s lack of enforcement has led to a culture that is very open 
to both pirating and engaging in cyber-attacks. Part III reviews a variety 
of attacks purportedly made by Russian citizens, possibly with the 
assistance of the government. It also details some of the difficulties in 
linking the attacks to the Russian government. Part IV describes the 
current state of attribution and responsibility for actions of both groups 
and individuals. Part V applies those principles to past cyber-attacks and 
potential future attacks, describing why Russia can and should be held 
responsible for the attacks.  
 
II. THE GROWTH OF A PERVASIVE PIRATING  
AND HACKING CULTURE 
 
Prior to discussing the attacks purportedly undertaken by Russian 
citizens, possibly with the complicity of the Russian government, it is 
useful to understand the historical attitudes Russia and its citizens have 
taken with respect to technology, intellectual property enforcement, and 
hacking and the ultimate establishment of a culture that is conducive to, 
and even supportive of, hacking. 
 
A. Legal Situation 
 
Legally, intellectual property has a basis in the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation: “Each [person] is guaranteed the freedom of literary, 
artistic, scientific, technical, and other forms of creation, and teaching. 																																								 																					
4 See Alpert, supra note 2. Despite investigations into the attacks, reports can only state that 
attacks “appear” to, “may,” or “are believed to” have originated from Russia or that machines in a 
specific country were used in an attack but may have been controlled by users in another country. 
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Intellectual property is protected by the law.”5 To protect intellectual 
property, Russia has established a variety of federal services that perform 
functions similar to the United States Patent and Trademark Office and 
Copyright Office. In particular, Rospatent “is a Federal executive 
authority performing functions of control and supervision in the area of 
the legal protection and exploitation of intellectual property rights, 
including patents and trademarks.”6 The Russian Civil Code provides a 
variety of standard protections to the holders of various intellectual 
property forms (copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets) including 
the right to exclude others from using that intellectual property, 
reimbursement for damages against those who have infringed on those 
rights, and seizure of infringing articles.7  
In addition, the Russian Criminal Code imposes liability on violators 
of copyright, patent, and trademark rights.8 The Criminal Code provides 
for penalties of 200,000 rubles or an amount in accordance with the 
income of the offender. Other potential penalties include forced labor for 
480 hours, correctional labor for one year, or arrest for six months if the 
holder of the right suffered “serious injury.” 9  Despite the legal 
foundation for intellectual property, the citizenry at large is often in 
violation of various forms of intellectual property.10  
In the realm of hacking and cyber-crime, Russia similarly has 
criminal provisions preventing unauthorized access to computer 
information, preventing the creation, use, and spread of harmful 
computer programs, and preventing the inappropriate use of computer 
and telecommunication networks.11 The penalties for creating harmful 
programs are even more severe than for infringement of intellectual 
property—up to four years of prison or forced labor.12 
 
																																								 																					
5 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 44(1) (Russ.) 
(translation by the author, emphasis added). 
6 About Rospatent, FEDERAL SERVICE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (ROSPATENT) (Nov. 2, 
2012, 12:21), http://www.rupto.ru/rupto/portal/7bea6e78-fbd2-11e0-e807-8e000200001f?lang=en. 
7  GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1225–1551 
(Russ.), available at http://www.rupto.ru/rupto/nfile/3b05468f-4b25-11e1-36f8-
9c8e9921fb2c/Civil_Code.pdf (unofficial translation by Rospatent). 
8 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 146–47, 180 
(Russ.). 
9 Id. at art. 146 (translation by the author). The penalties for violating patent rights are similar. 
Id. at art. 147. 
10  See Russian Federation: 2014 Special 301 Report on Copyright Protection and 
Enforcement, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE 61 (2014), available at 
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2014/2014SPEC301RUSSIA.PDF (noting that “VKontakte, the most 
popular online social network in Russia . . . is the largest single distributor of infringing music in 
Russia, and also is a hotbed for online piracy of movies,” that “Russian IP addresses accounted for 
more than 36% of the global volume of detected infringements occurring on public peer-to-peer 
networks,” and that “pre-release DVDs of major film titles often appear on the Internet (and then in 
pirate hard copies sold online or in markets), within a few days after the authorized theatrical 
release”). In addition, Russia is still on the International Intellectual Property Alliance Priority 
Watch list several years after acceding to the WTO. Press Release, International Intellectual Property 
Alliance, IIPA Urges Government Action to Reduce Copyright Piracy, Open Markets, and Protect 
Creators 1 (Feb. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2014_Feb07_SPEC301_PRESS_RELEASE.pdf. 
11 UGOLOVNYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] art. 272–74 (Russ.). 
12 Id. at art. 273. 
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B. Actual Situation 
 
As demonstrated above, the problem is not a lack of appropriate 
legislation. Rather, the main issue relates to jurisprudential practices and 
the lack of enforcement by authorities.13 This lack of enforcement is 
particularly visible when looking at the accessibility of counterfeit or 
pirated goods in Russia. Despite some indication of efforts on the part of 
governmental authorities, counterfeit goods are readily available in 
Russia.14 Fines are low when compared to other nations, liability is often 
not imposed on infringers, and police officers frequently are hesitant to 
initiate prosecution against the creators and distributors of counterfeit 
goods.15 For the over 1,300 raids conducted in 2004 targeting music 
pirates, an average penalty of fifty dollars was assessed—far too little to 
have any punitive or deterrent effect.16 While criminal penalties are 
available for violators of intellectual property rights, civil or 
administrative penalties are far more likely to be employed against the 
perpetrators.17 
There have been attempts to purge illegal content from Russian 
websites; however, these efforts have been ineffective thus far.18 Sites 
distributing pirated music, movies, and software are rampant in the 
Russian Internet system, with seemingly little effort taken to stop them.19 
The same facets that attract many technology businesses to Russia 
may also be leading to the development of harmful elements among the 
population. Google, Microsoft, and other companies seek out Russian 
programmers because of their high skills and relatively low wage level.20 
The Soviet Union was known for its strength in both math and science, 
and this tradition continues with Russia’s current educational system.21 
However, Soviet education was not limited to traditional subjects: having 
lived through chronic shortages, citizens developed strategies for 
survival that “included building networks, manipulating systems, [and] 
																																								 																					
13 Russian Federation: 2014 Special 301 Report, supra note 10 (noting a decline in the number 
of raids in 2013 versus prior years and the general preference of the Russian authorities to go after 
physical markets instead of online markets). 
14 Intellectual Property Enforcement in Russia and the Ukraine, CMS CAMERON MCKENNA 12 
(2013), http://www.cms-cmck.com/Hubbard.FileSystem/files/Publication/fa6e7d45-a045-41f4-a52f-
baf7700885fb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0b4352e7-acff-4a21-a718-f0d5e2dd0fd2/(S)%20 
1305-000055%20(V4)%20BROC%20Intellectual%20Property%20Enforcement%20in%20Russia% 
20and%20the%20Ukrain.pdf. 
15 Id. 
16 Candace S. Friel, The High Cost of Global Intellectual Property Theft: An Analysis of 
Current Trends, the TRIPS Agreement, and Future Approaches to Combat the Problem, 7 WAKE 
FOREST INTELL. PROP.  L.J. 209, 226 (2006). 
17 Esprit Eugster, Evolution and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Law in Russia, 9 WASH. 
U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 131, 147 (2010). 
18  Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The Bear Goes Digital: Russian and Its Cyber Capabilities, in 
CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND POWER IN A VIRTUAL 
WORLD 173, 179 (Derek S. Reveron, ed., 2012) (“Yuri Milner, the CEO of Digital Sky Technologies 
(who sits on the presidential commission tasked with overseeing Russia’s economic modernization) 
has been asked to look at ways that ‘illegal content’ could be purged from RUNET sites—a 
legitimate effort certainly to deal with copyright violations. . . .”). 
19 O’Connell, supra note 1. 
20 CMS CAMERON MCKENNA, supra note 14, at 4. 
21 Clifford J. Levy, What’s Russian for “Hacker”?, N.Y. TIMES WEEK IN REVIEW (Oct. 21, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/weekinreview/21levy.html?pagewanted=all. 
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solving problems by any means available.”22 It would seem that this 
history has helped lead to the belief that if an individual can do or gain 
something (by using computer skills or intelligence), the individual has 
earned what is obtained. Furthermore, the rampant corruption in Russia 
has likely led the average citizen to view adherence to the law as 
generally unnecessary—if the authorities do not need to obey the law, 
why should an average citizen?23 Western restrictions on technology 
transfers in the 1970s and 1980s also likely contributed to the current 
situation: computer specialists were forced to “disassembl[e], examin[e] 
and hack[] American systems to see how they worked in order to make 
them functional on Soviet systems.”24 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were simply not enough 
jobs in the former Soviet bloc for the computer talent that existed.25 With 
the end of the Soviet Union, large groups of talented high school and 
university students had a choice: enter the legitimate job market for 
salaries far below their skill level or seek much more lucrative offers 
available by hacking or working for criminal organizations.26 Indeed, 
hacking is not just a potential job, it is “one of the few good jobs left.”27 
This has led Russians to view hacking as a positive position: hackers are 
“fighters for [I]nternet freedom” and “high[ly] skilled programmer[s].”28 
Russia’s late entry into the Internet era along with a culture that is 
comparatively more xenophobic than others has led to the relatively self-
contained nature of the Russian Internet. “Russians tend to communicate 
with Russians in Russian about Russia-related topics. . . . The Russian 
blogosphere is, for the most part, an inwardly-focused social network.”29 
Russians have a tendency to use Russian sites instead of Western brands 
such as Google or Facebook. 30  Furthermore, government-friendly 
businesses own majorities in many of Russia’s most popular sites, 
including its social networking sites, to ensure that the government has 
access to and control over the majority of data generated in the country.31 
There seems to be an implied agreement between the Russian 
government and large Russian cybercriminals: 1) do not touch anything 
within Russia; 2) share anything you find that is of interest to the Russian 
government; 3) participate whenever Russia needs you for “patriotic 
activities.”32 As long as Russian cybercriminals follow these three rules, 
they maintain an “untouchable status.”33 
																																								 																					
22 Joseph D Serio & Alexander Gorkin, Changing Lenses: Striving for Sharper Focus on the 
Nature of the “Russian Mafia” and its Impact on the Computer Realm, INT’L REV. L. COMPUTERS & 
TECH. 191, 192 (2003). 
23 Levy, supra note 21. 
24 Serio & Gorkin, supra note 22, at 193. 
25 Id. 
26 Xinyuan Wang & Daniel Rasbrock, Chapter 8: The Botnet Problem, in NETWORK AND 
SYSTEM SECURITY 119, 123 (John A. Vacca ed., 2010). 
27 Serio & Gorkin, supra note 22, at 193 (quoting a Russian hacker). 
28 Roman Dremliugal, Subculture of Hackers in Russia, 10 ASIAN SOC, SCI. 158, 160 (2014). 
29 Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 174. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 179. 
32 Perlroth, supra note 2 (quoting Tom Kellerman, Chief Cybersecurity Officer at Trend 
Micro). 
33 Id. (quoting Tom Kellerman). 
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Evidence seems to suggest that law enforcement actions are taken 
against hackers after they target Russian institutions—there is no haste in 
prosecuting those who are attack the West.34 In addition, those who are 
arrested for hacking seem to be offered jobs working for the Federal 
Security Service (FSB) instead of being sent to prison.35 Indeed, the 
situation might “worsen as hacking, cracking[,] and virus writing shift 
from being a mischievous hobby of young kids to a lucrative occupation 
of skilled professionals working hand-in-hand with hardened 
criminals.”36 While those in the past viewed hacking as a noble endeavor, 
attempting to bring Western programs to the masses for free, modern 
Russians are more driven by the lack of adequate jobs. 37  Hacking 
magazines and software are sold on the streets, and there are plenty of 
students who excel at mathematics, computer science, and physics who 
are unable to find jobs.38 As recently as November 2013, the magazine 
“Hacker” was released with a DVD that contained computer programs 
that can crack passwords.39  
Part of the problem is the fact that, while hacking is illegal in Russia, 
it is not viewed as morally wrong.40 While Russians do not balk at the 
issuance of “Hacker,” they would likely not tolerate a magazine aimed at 
more physical crimes like burgling.41 Hackers are criminals only because 
of the legal prohibitions against it, not because of any moral 
opprobrium.42  
Perhaps connected to this, authorities do not pursue investigations 
into cyber-crime to the same extent as other crimes that are deemed 
higher priorities, particularly when the hacking has not been directed at 
Russian companies or organizations. 43  These hackers provide their 
services for a fee, using various sites to find willing buyers.44 The fact 
that hackers can use known websites and provide their services with little 
to no interference from federal authorities is troubling, to say the least.45 
Youth movements, with ties to the government, provide a network of 
hackers that target those who are viewed as opponents of Russia, 
																																								 																					
34 Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 180–81. 
35 Id. at 181. 
36 John Blau, Russia – A Happy Haven for Hackers, COMPUTER WEEKLY (last visited Sept. 17, 
2015), http://www.computerweekly.com/feature/Russia-a-happy-haven-for-hackers. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Dremliugal, supra note 28, at 160. 
40 Blau, supra note 36. 
41 Dremliugal, supra note 28, at 160. 
42 Id. 
43 Blau, supra note 36. In addition, Russian courts often choose lighter sentences when actions 
are taken against hackers, even when more harsh sentences are available. Dremliugal, supra note 28, 
at 160 (noting the light sentence for a cyber criminal who targeted the Russian airline Aeroflot). 
44 Max Goncharov, Trend Micro Incorporated Research Paper 2012: Russian Underground 
101, TREND MICRO (2012), available at http://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-
intelligence/white-papers/wp-russian-underground-101.pdf. Hackers offer to combine executable 
files with PDF files resulting in toxic files ($420), denial of service attacks ($10 per hour, $1,200 per 
month), botnets ($200 for 2,000 bots), social engineering services (i.e. non-software methods of 
gaining access to protected information), and account hacking, among many other services. Id. 
45 In assembling the data in the report, Trend Micro went to “online forums and services used 
by Russian cybercriminals” and “relied on articles written by hackers on their activities, the 
computer threats they create, and the kind of information they post on forums’ shopping sites.” Id. at 
1. 
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enabling the government to deny involvement.46 And because Russian 
hackers are often, in some aspects, better than their Western peers, the 
government has not seen the need to shut down one of its best weapons 
against the West.47 As long as hackers do not target organizations inside 
the country and participate in government-sponsored campaigns when 
asked, the government sees no reason to shut them down.48 
 
III. LINKING RUSSIA AND RUSSIANS TO PAST CYBER-CRIMES 
 
A. Estonia in 2007 
 
In 2007, a feud erupted between Estonia and Russia over the removal 
of a Soviet war monument from the center of Tallinn to a military 
cemetery.49 In the following weeks, rioting and looting by thousands of 
ethnic Russians ensued, which Estonia purported was orchestrated by 
Russia.50 In Russia, Estonia’s embassy was attacked.51 Amidst all of the 
physical violence and confrontations, a cyber battle was raging against 
both Estonia’s State websites and private sites: a series of “denial of 
service” attacks rendered the sites inoperable.52 Sites that averaged one 
thousand visits per day received two thousand hits per second.53 Some of 
the attacks defaced Estonian websites, adding Russian propaganda or 
bogus apologies to the sites.54 The attacks lasted approximately three 
weeks, during which Estonia requested that Russia help stop the attacks 
to no avail. 55  Finally, Estonia reached out to NATO allies for 
assistance.56 
The financial losses alone from the relatively simple attacks were 
quite staggering, with some estimating the total at 750 million euros.57 
While Estonia claimed that some of the earliest attacks came from 
computers with ties to the Russian government, most of the attacks came 
from ordinary computers throughout the world.58 Instructions on how to 																																								 																					
46 Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 181–82. 
47 Antone Gonsalves, Why Russian Hackers Are Beating Us, CSO ONLINE (Aug. 28, 2014, 
7:01 PM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2600212/data-protection/why-russian-hackers-are-
beating-us.html#tk.rss_news?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=infor 
mation_security%20 (describing how Russians strategically think several moves ahead both 
defensively and offensively and how the government views underground hacking as a national 
resource). The Russian marketplace for hacking services has been described as the “true Silicon 
Valley of the East,” providing the “greatest expertise when it comes to ethical hacking, penetration 
testing[,] and black-hat hacking.” Id. 
48 Id. See also Blau, supra note 36 (discussing a penalty, albeit a light one, for a criminal who 
targeted Aeroflot). 
49 David Weissbrodt, Cyber-Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber Espionage, 22 MINN. J. INT’L 
L. 347, 349–50 (2013). 
50 Estonia and Russia: A Cyber-Riot, THE ECONOMIST 42 (May 12, 2007). 
51 Id. 
52 Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to Cyberattacks: A Justification 
for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 
1, 5 (2009). 
53 Christopher Rhoads, Cyber Attack Vexes Estonia, Poses Debate, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2007, 
12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB117944513189906904. 
54 Estonia and Russia, supra note 50. 
55  Catherine Lotrionte, State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A Normative 
Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825, 897–98 (2012). 
56 Sklerov, supra note 52, at 5. 
57 Gvosdev, supra note 18, at 183. 
58 Estonia and Russia, supra note 50. 
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perform a “denial of service” attack spread on Russian-language Internet 
sites. 59  Of course, any attempt to link the attacks to the Russian 
government is significantly complicated because of the use of 
“botnets”—computers that have been infected by a virus and take part in 
the attacks without the owner of the computer knowing.60 Articles at the 
time noted the lack of appropriate recourse for such targeted attacks.61 
Even if there were a proper recourse, there is little evidence to prove that 
the Russian government was behind the attacks. IP addresses can be 
cloned and “botnets” can be used, making it difficult, if not impossible, 
to determine whether or not the Russian government was involved in the 
attacks.62 
In the aftermath of the attacks, Russia refused to assist Estonia in 
tracking down the attackers.63 They refused to investigate the incident at 
all.64 Two years after the attacks, a leader from a pro-Kremlin youth 
group, Nashi, claimed that the youth group had orchestrated the cyber 
attacks.65 While Nashi appears to be well-supported among Russian 
youth, there are also allegations that the Kremlin pays people to attend 
protests and rallies.66  In addition, emails have been revealed which 
purport that Nashi has been used as a tool for pro-Putin propaganda.67 
 
B. South Ossetia in 2008 
 
In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to expel its forces from 
South Ossetia.68 This was the first large-scale cyber attack conducted 
parallel to traditional military operations.69 The cyber attacks isolated 
Georgia from the outside world and had significant informational and 
psychological impacts. For example, Georgia was not able to 
communicate information to its citizens during the conflict.70 The initial 
attacks targeted news and government websites, starting just shortly 
before the commencement of the physical altercations, seemingly 
indicating that the attackers were involved with the government or at 
least had obtained reliable inside information about the date of the 
planned attack beforehand.71 Similar to the attacks against Estonia, the 
initial attacks against Georgia were denial of service attacks carried out 
																																								 																					
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See, e.g., Binoy Kampmark, Cyber Warfare Between Estonia and Russia, CONTEMP. REV. 
288 (Autumn 2007) (“International law remains silent, caught off guard in the face of such 
technological onslaughts. International aggression, for one, remains a state-centred concept, despite 
the challenges mounted by the terrorist fascination of GWOT . . . . ‘Aggression’, reads one UN 
General Assembly resolution, ‘is the use of armed force by a State against . . . another State . . . .”). 
62 Wang & Rasbrock, supra note 26, at 119. 
63 Sklerov, supra note 52, at 10. 
64 Lotrionte, supra note 55, at 897–98. 
65  PAULO SHAKARIAN, JANA SHAKARIAN & ANDREW RUEF, INTRODUCTION TO CYBER-
WARFARE: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 19 (2013). Nashi was also named as the culprit in the 
attacks in a top-secret 2009 NSA report. Perlroth, supra note 2. 
66 SHAKARIAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 19. 
67 Id. 
68 Lotrionte, supra note 55, at 898. 
69 SHAKARIAN ET AL., supra note 65, at 24. 
70 Sklerov, supra note 52, at 5. 
71 Id. at 4–5. 
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through botnets.72 The particular botnets used against Georgian websites 
were affiliated with criminal organizations in Russia, including the 
Russian Business Network.73 
The second phase of the attacks broadened the targets. Instead of just 
attacking media and government sites, the hackers also targeted financial 
institutions, businesses, education institutions, and Western media 
companies. The strategy involved defacement of websites in addition to 
the denial of service attacks.74 The second phase also involved recruiting 
Russian computer users—hacktivists—especially those who were 
members of youth movements, including Nashi. 75  Many websites, 
including StopGeorgia.ru, provided instructions on launching denial of 
service attacks that were accessible even to novice users. 76  These 
websites were well policed by administrators, limiting access to U.S.-
based security scans and removing references to military operations.77 
Despite Georgian attempts to limit Russian attacks by filtering IP 
addresses, the attackers hid or spoofed their IP addresses and continued 
their attacks.78 
After the conflict in Georgia, one Russian individual described how 
he became a “cyber warrior” by following some steps on different blog 
sites: 
 
In less than an hour, I had become an Internet soldier. I 
didn’t receive any calls from Kremlin operatives . . . . 
My experiment also might shed some light on why the 
recent cyberwar has been so hard to pin down and why 
no group in particular has claimed responsibility. . . . 
[W]e risk underestimating the great patriotic rage of 
many ordinary Russians, who, having been fed too much 
government propaganda in the last few days, are 
convinced that they need to crash Georgian Web sites. 
Many Russians undoubtedly went online to learn how to 
make mischief, as I did. Within an hour, they, too, could 
become cyberwarriors.79 
 
While there are certainly official cyber units in Russia, handshake 
arrangements or other secretive relationships between the government 
and hackers provide a way for the government to plausibly deny the 
allegations that it is engaging in cyber warfare.80 The fact that there was 
apparently a detailed cyber attack plan in place, ready to go into action, 
would seem to indicate that the hackers’ efforts were “probably 
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coordinated . . . with the Russian military even if no conclusive evidence 
exists of such collaboration.”81 
Despite significant research by the Grey Goose project and the U.S. 
Cyber Consequences Unit, there is no conclusive evidence that links the 
Russian government to the cyber-attacks launched against Estonia or 
Georgia.82 Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, there is some heft to 
the idea that the government was involved. 
 
C. Target in 2013 
 
From late November through the middle of December 2013, the U.S. 
retail chain Target was the victim of a hack that compromised the data of 
millions of customers, including information of forty million credit and 
debit card accounts.83 Soon after the breach, the data was available on the 
black market. 84  All told, personal data for up to seventy million 
customers were taken in the attack.85 Target and its partners lost more 
than two hundred million dollars as a consequence of the breach.86  
The attack was not limited to Target, however. The same virus used 
in the Target attack also reached over one thousand other U.S. 
businesses.87 More recently, Home Depot suffered a similar attack dating 
from approximately April 2014 until September 2014.88 Similar to the 
previous attacks in Estonia and Georgia, there is nothing to link the 
Russian government to these attacks. But unlike the prior two incidents, 
there is little political incentive for Russia to go after retailers in the 
United States. 
Still, there is some evidence that a teenage Russian hacker created 
the malware that caused the security breach in these cases.89 While he did 
not actually attack the department stores, he purportedly wrote the 
software that was eventually sold to the cyber attackers.90 The malware 
was offered for sale for approximately two thousand dollars, with 
discounts offered to those who agreed to share any profits made by using 
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the software.91 Part of the malware was written in Russian.92 In addition, 
the information that was stolen from Target shoppers was taken from a 
server in the United States and then sent to a server in Russia.93 Of 
course, even the assertions that a Russian citizen created the malware and 
that the data were eventually sent to Russia does not implicate the 
Russian government in the attacks for many of the reasons that have been 
discussed above. Due to the relative ease with which information can be 
obscured digitally and the fact that the information can be later retrieved 
from a server in Russia and sent elsewhere, it is impossible to say if the 
actual attackers were located in Russia. 
 
D. Ongoing Attacks—Energy Companies, Financial Institutions,  
and More 
 
While not as significant as the attacks against Estonia and Georgia, 
cyber-attacks happen continually. These attacks generally focus on 
stealing money from international banks and corporations and personal 
data from individuals in order to commit fraud.94  This year alone, 
Russian hackers have been blamed for attacking oil and gas companies,95 
placing a digital bomb in the NASDAQ, 96  hacking financial 
institutions,97 and spying on both the Ukrainian government and a U.S. 
scholar who specializes in Russian culture.98 In addition, breaches into 
the White House computer networks and government computer networks 
have occurred with some degree of regularity.99 While most of these 
events were relatively benign in terms of their effects, the potential 
effects—particularly related to the energy companies—could be quite 
devastating.100  The motives in these cases seem to be industrial or 																																								 																					
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corporate espionage, which would be a violation of the rights of the 
companies for their intellectual property. However, more troubling is that 
the method used by the hackers “also gives them the opportunity to seize 
control of industrial control systems from afar.”101 The Russian groups 
that invaded the energy companies could have used their “toehold in 
some networks to inflict damage, like blowing up an oil rig or power 
facility,” but there is no evidence that they intended to do that.102 
In addition to attacks that are focused on shutting down websites, 
Russian sources, including State intelligence services, have been accused 
of pursuing hacking activities to steal economic information and 
technology from targets in the United States, specifically targeting 
research and development.103 Russia and China were singled out in a 
recent report for being “the foreign intelligence services and countries 
that are doing the most harm.”104 In particular, areas where the U.S. has 
had a competitive advantage were targeted: pharmaceuticals, aeronautics, 
and advanced manufacturing techniques. 105  While China is the 
predominant threat in targeting U.S. intellectual property and trade 
secrets, Russia is also a significant source of problems.106 
 
IV. EXISTING STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTIONS OF 
ITS CITIZENS THAT HAVE IMPACTS OUTSIDE OF THE STATE 
 
Given the potentially far ranging and damaging effects of these 
attacks on outside nations, some important questions need to be asked. 
What is the duty of Russia with respect to controlling its citizens? Can 
the attacks be attributed to Russia? Can Russia be held responsible for 
the actions of its citizens? Attribution and State responsibility are key 
facets of international law. Without attribution of actions to a State or the 
responsibility of a State with respect to those actions, nations may be left 
without adequate recourse.107 Without a responsible State, a country is 
left with few options to protect itself from outside threats. Specifically, 
the State could develop greater defensive capabilities in its own cyber 
system, strike out against those who are believed to be the attackers, or 
attempt to reach a diplomatic solution to the problem with the country 
that is host to the cyber attackers.  
However, none of these solutions seems to be an adequate response. 
Developing effective defenses takes time and resources, and the defenses 
are often quickly circumvented by continually evolving attacks. Counter-
attacks are not likely to deter future threats because of the speed and ease 
with which the attackers set up new equipment. Finally, current world 
dynamics do not exert sufficient pressure on countries for them to 																																								 																					
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regulate attacks originating within their own borders. Some have argued 
that counting only on passive defense mechanisms, such as anti-virus 
programs, firewalls, encryption, and automated detection, will lack any 
significant power of deterrence because such measures do not collect 
data that can lead to an identification of the perpetrator and thus allows 
the perpetrator to evade prosecution. In other words, the wrongful acts 
will continue with impunity.108 
 
A. Attribution under the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts 
 
The Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts provide thorough understanding of the existing customary 
international law on attribution of the actions of non-State actors to 
States.109 The articles describe the baseline for assessing whether a State 
should be held responsible for the effects of actions of individuals or 
groups with ties to the State.110 There are several ways to attribute 
conduct to a State. According to the articles, actions by organs of that 
State, as defined by the internal law of the State, qualify as acts of the 
State itself.111 This applies to all levels of government, such as central, 
provincial, and local, and all branches of government, including 
legislative, executive, and judicial.112 Even actions of institutions that are 
autonomous in a given country but are normally institutions of the 
government, such as the police force, will be attributed to the State.113  
In addition, if a person or entity “is in fact acting on the instructions 
of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying out the 
conduct,” the conduct is considered an act of the State.114 For instance, 
“when State organs supplement their own action by recruiting or 
instigating private persons or groups who act as ‘auxiliaries’ while 
remaining outside the official structure of the State,” the actions of those 
private persons or groups are attributable to the State.115 Direction or 
control presents a more complex issue,116 as will be discussed below with 
regard to cases from the International Court of Justice. It “does not 
extend to conduct which was only incidentally or peripherally associated 
with an operation.”117 Only one of the three requirements, “instructions,” 
“direction,” or “control,” must be met, but it must relate to the wrongful 
conduct.118 
In addition to the draft articles, international courts have provided 
insight into what is required for attribution of acts to a State. In 																																								 																					
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particular, the International Court of Justice, in its Nicaragua v. United 
States and Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro cases, 
established a framework for analyzing the relationship between the 
parties and States. 
In Nicaragua v. United States, the United States was accused of 
“recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and 
otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and 
paramilitary actions in and against Nicaragua,” thus constituting a use of 
force against Nicaragua with armed attacks.119 After an initial period of 
covert operations, official statements by the President of the United 
States made clear that the U.S. government had been giving support to 
the contras, those who were fighting against the Nicaraguan 
government. 120  Congressional budgetary legislation “made specific 
provision for funds to be used by United States intelligence agencies for 
supporting ‘directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in 
Nicaragua.’”121 Financing for the military and paramilitary activities of 
the contras was a part of the budget of the United States from 1981 until 
1984. 122  The financing was used by the CIA to provide “arms, 
munitions[,] and military equipment, including uniforms, boots[,] and 
radio equipment,”123 along with training in “guerrilla warfare, sabotage, 
demolitions, and in the use of a variety of weapons” and intelligence 
regarding Nicaraguan troop movements.124 
In sum, the support provided by the United States to the contras 
included, at different times, “logistic support, the supply of information 
on the location and movements of . . . troops, the use of sophisticated 
methods of communication, the deployment of field broadcasting 
networks, radar coverage, etc.”125 In addition, several of the military and 
paramilitary operations “were decided and planned, if not actually by 
United States advisers, then at least in close collaboration with them, and 
on the basis of the intelligence and logistic support” which the United 
States offered.126 U.S. “authorities largely financed, trained, equipped, 
armed and organized” the contras in their fight with the Nicaraguan 
government.127 
Despite the “heavy subsidies and other support provided . . . by the 
United States,” the Court determined that there was “no clear evidence of 
the United States having actually exercised such a degree of control in all 
fields as to justify” impugning the actions of the contras to the United 
States.128 In coming to this conclusion, the Court noted that contra 
activity continued, even after military aid was no longer authorized.129 
Thus, the contras could not be said to be in a state of “complete 																																								 																					
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dependence” on the State.130 In establishing the degree of control of a 
State over a non-State group, the selection, installation, and payment of 
leaders of the group is but one factor.131 In addition, even given the 
“financing, organizing, training, supplying[,] and equipping of the 
contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the 
planning of the whole of its operation,” not all acts committed by the 
contras could be attributed to the United States—the United States would 
need to have had “effective control of the military or paramilitary 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed.”132 
In Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina attempted to attribute the actions of Republika Srpska, 
namely its army, the Vojska Republike Srpske (VRS) in committing 
atrocities in the city of Srebrenica to Yugoslavia.133 “Thousands of men 
and boys were summarily executed and buried in mass graves within a 
matter of days” while the international community attempted to gain 
access to them. 134  The women, children, and elderly people “were 
uprooted and, in an atmosphere of terror, loaded onto overcrowded buses 
. . . and transported across the confrontation lines into Bosnian Muslim-
held territory.”135 Military-aged men were “taken prisoner, detained in 
brutal conditions[,] and then executed.”136 There were allegedly close ties 
between Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska politically and financially; 
Yugoslavia also allegedly had ties to the administration and control of 
the VRS.137 For slightly over ten percent of the officers in the VRS, 
“payment, promotions, pensions, etc. were handled, not by the Republika 
Srpska, but by the [Yugoslavian army].”138 The VRS was also “armed 
and equipped” by Yugoslavia, with up to ninety percent of its material 
needs being supplied by Yugoslavia. 139  The Court determined that 
Yugoslavia “was . . . making its considerable military and financial 
support available to the Republika Srpska, and had it withdrawn that 
support, this would have greatly constrained the options that were 
available to the Republika Srpska authorities.”140 
In evaluating whether the acts were attributable to Yugoslavia, the 
Court began its analysis with an investigation into the legal recognition 
of the perpetrators of the action.141 If the acts were not perpetrated by 
organs of the State, it needed to determine if they “were committed by 
persons who, while not organs of the [State], did nevertheless act on the 																																								 																					
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instructions of, or under the direction or control of, the [State].”142 
Organs of a State can be either de jure organs, those that hold the status 
of organ under the internal law of a State,143 or de facto organs, those that 
“in fact act under such strict control by the State that they must be treated 
as its organs.”144 Even substantial financial support does not make a 
group a State organ.145 Referring back to its Nicaragua decision, the 
Court reiterated that a de facto organ is a body over which a State 
“exercise[s] such a degree of control in all fields” and which is in 
“complete dependence on [the State’s] aid.” 146  However, “complete 
dependence” will not be found often, as “to equate persons or entities 
with State organs when they do not have that status under internal law 
must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of 
State control over them.”147 
In keeping with this standard, despite the “strong and close” 
“political, military[,] and logistical relations” between the federal 
authorities of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, they were not of such a 
degree as to prevent Republika Srpska from acting with “some qualified, 
but real, margin of independence.” 148  In addition, even though the 
support given by Yugoslavia was such that Republika Srpska “could not 
have ‘conduct[ed] its crucial or most significant military and paramilitary 
activities’” without it, it was not in a state of “total dependence.”149 
After deciding that VRS was neither a de jure nor a de facto organ of 
Yugoslavia, the Court considered whether attribution could be founded 
on “direction or control.” 150  While this may seem similar to the 
determination of a de facto organ of the State, this investigation instead 
relates to Article 8 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts. 151  This question does not deal with the general 
circumstances surrounding the group, but instead whether the State, “in 
the specific circumstances surrounding [a particular event]” instructed, 
directed, or controlled the group to perform the actions. 152  Again 
referring back to its Nicaragua case, the Court reiterated that legal 
responsibility arises if a State is in “effective control of the . . . 
operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed.”153 Here, “complete control” is not required, only a State’s 
instructions or its “effective control,” which seems to lessen the burden 
on a plaintiff State.154 However, the instructions or control must be given 
“in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, 
not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or 
groups of persons who committed the violations.”155 In reaching its 																																								 																					
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conclusion, the Court specifically rejected the application of the “overall 
control” test used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in establishing the presence of an international 
conflict for Yugoslavia with regard to the Republika Srpska and the 
VRS.156 Reports after the events in Srebrenica did not suggest that 
Yugoslavian “leadership was involved in planning the attack or inciting 
the killing of non-Serbs; nor [was there] any hard evidence of assistance 
by the Yugoslav army to the armed forces of the Republika Srpska 
before the attack,” thus actions could not be attributed to Yugoslavia.157 
   
B. Responsibility to Prevent Damaging Acts under a Duty of Care 
 
State responsibility has primarily developed to limit the 
responsibility of a State for actions of individual private citizens or 
groups within its borders.158 In the comments to the Draft articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, specific 
mention is made of how all acts linked to the State by nationality, 
habitual residence, or incorporation could be attributed to the State. 
However, such an approach was avoided “both with a view to limiting 
responsibility to conduct which engages the State as an organization, and 
also so as to recognize the autonomy of persons acting on their own 
account and not at the instigation of a public authority.”159 “Conduct of 
private persons is not as such attributable to the State.”160 However, past 
thought on the matter seemed to be more open to assigning responsibility 
to a State for actions of individuals: “A state owes at all times a duty to 
protect other states against injurious acts by individuals from within its 
jurisdiction.”161 In coming to its conclusion, the commentary on the draft 
articles cites the Tellini case of 1923.162 
Tellini involved the assassination of Italian members of an 
international commission while on Greek territory.163 While Tellini, an 
Italian, was assisting in the delimitation of the Greece-Albania border, an 																																								 																					
156 Id. at 209 ¶ 403. In particular, the Court noted that the ICTY did not “rule on questions of 
State responsibility, since its jurisdiction is criminal and extends over persons only.” Id. While the 
ICJ respected the “factual and legal findings made by the ICTY,” it did not feel the need to do so for 
positions “on issues of general international law which do not lie within the specific purview of [the 
ICTY’s] jurisdiction.” Id. The Court decided that broadening the scope of State responsibility, which 
would occur under the “overall control” test, would result in a State being responsible for more than 
its own conduct. Id. at 210 ¶ 406. This tends to “stretch[] too far, almost to breaking point, the 
connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international 
responsibility.” Id. The Court’s decision not to apply the “overall control” test of Tadić and its 
reasoning have been criticized by some academics. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and 
Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649 
(2007). Furthermore, others argue that, due to the difficulty of proving the identity of cyber 
attackers, the “overall control” standard of Tadić is particularly well suited to issues surrounding 
cyber-crime. Scott J. Shackelford, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Competing Standards for 
a Growing Problem, available at http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/001/501281.pdf.  
157 Bosn. & Herz., 2007 I.C.J. 212–13 ¶ 410. 
158 Id. at 208 ¶ 400. 
159 Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 
111, at ch. II cmt. (2).  
160 Id. at ch. II cmt. (3). 
161 CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80 (1928). 
162 Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 
111, at ch. II cmt. (3). 
163 Id. 
SUMMER 2015                              RUSSIA’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CYBER CRIME  
	72	
unknown party ambushed him and killed him. 164  The International 
Commission requested redress from Greece because it accused Greece of 
exercising neglect in pursuing the criminals. 165  The Council of the 
League of Nations referred the question of Greece’s responsibility for the 
incident to a Special Commission. Specifically, it asked: “In what 
circumstances and to what extent is the responsibility of a State involved 
by the commission of a political crime in its territory?” 166  The 
Commission determined that:  
 
[T]he responsibility of a State is only involved by the 
commission in its territory of a political crime against 
the persons of foreigners if the State has neglected to 
take all reasonable measures for the prevention of the 
crime and the pursuit, arrest[,] and bringing to justice of 
the criminal.167  
 
The Commission added a caveat to its findings: “The recognized 
public character of a foreigner and the circumstances in which he is 
present in its territory entail upon the State a corresponding duty of 
special vigilance on his behalf.”168 Thus, while the particular facts of the 
Tellini case seem to limit the application of responsibility, it shows that 
there are times when States could be held responsible for the actions of 
private individuals within their borders. 
Several Court cases have repeated this idea in different contexts. In 
the Corfu Channel Case, the Court was asked to determine whether 
Albania was responsible for damage caused by mines in its waters.169 
British cruisers and destroyers left the port of Corfu and sailed through 
the North Corfu Strait. 170  A mine heavily damaged one of the 
destroyers.171 When a second destroyer attempted to tow the damaged 
destroyer to safety, it too struck a mine.172 Both destroyers returned to 
Corfu.173 Investigations revealed that the minefield, located in Albanian 
territorial waters, had been recently laid. 174  In ascertaining the 
responsibility of Albania for the damage caused by the mines, the Court 
determined that Albania need not have taken part in the laying of the 
mines to nonetheless be responsible.175 
The Court examined whether Albania knew, or should have known, 
(given potentially circumstantial evidence) that the mines had been 
laid.176  If Albania knew about the mines prior to the incident with 																																								 																					
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sufficient time to warn the British vessels, it would be responsible for the 
incident.177 In this case, “the obligations incumbent upon the Albanian 
authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of shipping in general, 
the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning 
the approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the 
minefield exposed them.”178 These obligations stem from “general and 
well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of 
humanity . . . and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”179 
Albania’s omission—choosing to remain silent rather than to warn the 
British ships—thus resulted in its international responsibility for the 
incident.180 
More recently, the Court reiterated the obligation of a State to 
prevent or limit harm to other States in United States v. Iran. Similar to 
the Corfu Channel Case, this case does not deal with government action; 
instead Iran was accused of “tolerating, encouraging, and failing to 
prevent and punish conduct” that resulted in the United States being 
unable “to have access to its diplomatic and consular representatives, 
premises[,] and archives in Iran.”181  
After the United States allowed the former Shah of Iran to enter its 
territory for medical treatment, large demonstrations took place in Iran, 
and many demonstrators marched in front of the United States Embassy 
but did not cause any issues.182 A few days later, however, an armed 
group of demonstrators overran the embassy compound with no 
resistance from the Iranian security personnel.183 All of the diplomatic 
and consular personnel were taken hostage and detained in the 
compound.184 Despite repeated calls for help, no forces were sent in time 
to provide protection.185 The following day, consulates in two other cities 
were seized without any protective action on the part of the Iranian 
government.186  
The militants who attacked the embassy had no official status as 
organs of the Iranian State and there was not sufficient information 
before the Court to establish a link between the militants and the State: 
this was not a case of a de jure or de facto organ of the State.187 While 
the Ayatollah Khomeini had issued several public declarations calling for 
students “to expand with all their might their attacks against the United 
States,” the declaration was far from State authorization to take the 
specific actions (invading and occupying the Embassy) that were 
ultimately taken.188 Even celebratory phone calls after the event “do not 																																								 																					
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alter the initially independent and unofficial character of the militants’ 
attack on the embassy.”189 However, despite the fact that the Iranian 
government was not involved in the initial actions of the militants in 
seizing the embassies, its lack of action in taking any “appropriate steps” 
to protect the embassy against attack or to prevent the attack demonstrate 
“more than mere negligence or lack of appropriate means.”190  
Because Iran was “fully aware of [its] obligations under the 
conventions in force,” because it was “fully aware . . . of the urgent need 
for action,” because it “had the means at [its] disposal to perform [its] 
obligations,” and because it “completely failed to comply with these 
obligations,” it could be held responsible for the results of the actions of 
the militants. 191  Notably, however, this case deals with obligations 
arising under the Vienna Conventions,192 not a customary law to prevent 
harm to other nations. 
It is important to note that these cases developed long before the 
issuance of the draft articles on State responsibility. The Iran case was 
decided twenty years prior to the articles, which, as mentioned before, 
seem to downplay the ability of States to be held responsible for the 
actions of private citizens.193 However, the principles and the ideas stated 
are very applicable to the idea of rectifying, and hopefully reducing, the 
effects of transnational cyber-crime. 
 
V. APPLICATION TO PAST CYBER-CRIME AND POTENTIAL 
APPLICATION TO FUTURE MISDEEDS 
 
A. Difficulty of Attribution 
 
As discussed above in reference to the various attacks in which 
Russia has been implicated, no direct evidence of the involvement of a 
Russian organ in the attacks has ever been found, despite an abundance 
of circumstantial evidence to that effect.194 Thus, none of the situations to 
date (and likely no situation in the future, barring reckless work on the 
part of official State agencies) can be viewed as the actions of de jure 
organs of Russia. 
Attempting to apply the Nicaragua standard shows the problems 
faced by States that are subject to cyber-attacks. Barring significant 
missteps by the attackers, it will be nearly impossible to meet the high 
threshold requirement of control that the Court has enunciated—it is 
simply too difficult to pin down an exact source.195 Even the process of 																																								 																					
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determining the source of an attack is fraught with difficulties. For 
example, hackers can mask their location by writing the code at odd 
hours or in another language to avoid detection.196  Thus, even the 
traditional tools of computer forensics—looking at the style used by the 
attackers, the timing, and the targets—only leave an idea as to who 
performed the attack.197 The result, however, is still a guess, even if it is a 
very good guess.198 This still does not conclusively prove any connection 
between the attackers and the Russian government.199 
Furthermore, the differences between traditional weapon attacks and 
cyber-attacks are quite dramatic. While military tactics and intel can be 
shared without physical contact, sharing actual weapons requires 
delivery of tangible goods. As evidenced in the Georgia scenario, cyber 
weapons, particularly for more simple attacks such as denial of service 
attacks, can be “distributed” by merely posting information on an open 
website, then having would-be attackers read the website and perform 
the attack themselves, without the need for special equipment from any 
government actors.200  
Quite simply, a government does not need to provide any physical 
equipment to private citizens to carry out the attack. Individuals can use 
their own computers or cell phones and Internet connections to launch 
attacks against locations throughout the world. Again, a simple posting 
on a website is all that is needed to provide “weapons,” “training,” and 
“guidance” regarding what private citizens need to do in order to carry 
out cyber-attacks. Contrast this with the training, arms, equipment, and 
information about troop movement that were given by the United States 
to the contras or the ninety percent of material support provided by 
Yugoslavia to the VRS.201 Simple cyber-attacks require a much lower 
level of tangible and monetary support than physical altercations. 																																								 																					
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Even though average Russian citizens “could not have conduct[ed] 
[their] crucial or most significant” cyber-attacks without guidance 
(possibly from the Russian government through private websites), they 
would, similar to the scenario in Bosnia & Herzegovina, not be in a state 
of “total dependence” because they still maintained “some qualified, but 
real, margin of independence.”202 Ordinary Russian citizens, similar to 
the individuals described earlier, did not receive any call to action from 
the government—instead they were inspired by their own nationalistic 
feelings to launch attacks against Georgia.203 It seems to stretch credulity 
to believe that loosely-associated individuals or even partially sponsored 
or allied youth groups such as Nashi would be considered in “complete 
dependence” on the Russian government despite any financial assistance 
they may receive from it. 
Even the instructions, directions, or control standard of Article 8 is 
difficult to meet in this situation. Providing instructions on how to 
perform a denial of service attack or intimating that cyber-crime 
organizations would go unpunished if they stand ready to participate in 
activities that Russia requires both seem to indicate a degree of 
connection between the attackers and the government. But due to the 
limited evidence of communication between the two groups, it is difficult 
to say that Russia gave instructions or exercised control “in respect of 
each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in 
respect of the overall actions taken.”204 The very nature of cyber-crime in 
Russia is that of an unspoken agreement— groups are to take action in 
support of the government against outside forces and join in other efforts 
when they are taking place.205 There is no need to wait for a request from 
the government. While directions were given in each case (instructions 
on how to perform a denial of service attack and sites to target), once 
again there is no connection between those instructions and the Russian 
government.206 Instead, there appears to be a lack of any “effective 
control;” the Russian government allowed the citizens to act on their 
own, on behalf of their country. Even considering the potential funding 
of youth groups, the connection is too tenuous—Nicaragua involved 
significant and essential funding of paramilitary groups by the United 
States, but the groups’ actions were still not attributable to the United 
States.207 
The attacks against Target and other commercial retailers in the 
United States have an even more tenuous connection to the Russian 
government. Unlike Estonia and Georgia, and even the later attacks 
against Western financial institutions and energy companies, Russia does 
not seem to have any reason to target U.S. retailers. Of course, stealing 
funds from Western companies instead of Russian companies is 
definitely in line with the general agreement that seems to have been 																																								 																					
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made between Russian hackers and the government, but there does not 
seem to be “complete dependence” or even instructions, direction, or 
control. Without any real connection to the Russian government, the 
attacks against Target and other U.S. businesses are even less likely to be 
attributable to Russia or to Russian hackers than are the other attacks 
mentioned above. 
Going forward, it is likely that only attacks occurring at politically 
opportune times could ever be attributable to Russia under the 
framework established by Nicaragua and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Such 
an attack might be targeted against financial institutions in the aftermath 
of the introduction of financial sanctions against Russia or against energy 
companies after the introduction of sanctions prohibiting technological 
transfer from Western oil super majors to Russian companies. Because 
hackers have the ability to obfuscate information and misdirect any 
attempt to find the source of an attack and because outside countries are 
unable to see the communications between the Russian government and 
the attackers, the Nicaragua and Bosnia & Herzegovina framework does 
not provide much, if any, recourse for the victims of cyber-attacks. 
 
B. Fittingness of Holding Russia Responsible  
Because of Its Hacker Culture 
 
The somewhat older framework, as described in Tellini, Corfu 
Channel Case, and Iran, seem perfectly suited to meet the needs of 
protecting States. If a State is responsible for the actions of its citizens 
when it has “neglected to take all reasonable measures for the prevention 
of the crime and the pursuit, arrest[,] and bringing to justice of the 
criminal,” then Russia’s choice to not assist Estonia should implicate 
Russia as a responsible party.208 While Tellini involved political crimes, 
its principle could be applicable here, particularly because Russia seems 
to allow citizens to use cyber tactics against foreign entities while 
vigorously preventing them from using the same tactics against its own 
government.209  Furthermore, considering the rationale stated in Iran, 
even if a State is not involved in the initial actions of a rogue group of 
citizens, it is still under an obligation to take “appropriate steps” to 
prevent attacks or stop them—unless the State lacks the means to do 
so.210 Again, Russia’s prowess in cyber matters is not debatable—other 
than the United States, Russia is perhaps the most advanced cyber nation 
in the world.211 It has “the means at [its] disposal” to, at the very least, 
slow down or stop attacks that are in progress (especially when the 
attacks continue for several weeks) and to search for those who are 
responsible and attempt to prosecute them. Thus, Russia’s strong ability 
in this area, combined with its decision to not assist Estonia in stopping 
the attacks, finding the criminals, or even investigating the crimes, shows 
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a significant degree of neglect, similar to what was described in both the 
Tellini and Iran cases. 
Equally cogent is the argument made by the International Court of 
Justice in the Corfu Channel Case: “every State [has an] obligation not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of 
other States.” 212  By allowing groups of known hackers to continue 
unabated during times of peace and by not interfering to stop the hackers 
after cyber-attacks have begun, Russia is knowingly allowing “its 
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights” of other nations—in 
this case Estonia. States have an obligation to stop their own citizens 
from harming other States, particularly after the victim State has reached 
out for assistance in dealing with the problem, as was the case with 
Estonia. This is due to the inherent disadvantages of not having physical 
access to the alleged perpetrators. States are much better positioned to 
control cyber-attacks that originate from within their borders, therefore 
States should have greater responsibility for controlling such actions.213 
For all these reasons, Russia should be held responsible for its inaction 
with respect to Estonia under the principles expressed in Tellini, Corfu 
Channel Case, and Iran. 
This is not to say that any act by a private citizen should be 
answerable by the State. Some attacks are likely not preventable—they 
may happen without warning or are finished so quickly that no State 
could have responded to the action in time to prevent it. The Target 
incident, particularly as it relates to the purported author of the virus (but 
not necessarily as it regards those who actually used the virus), fits into 
this category. It is unlikely that a State will be able to prevent the 
creation of every virus that private citizens set out to create.214 However, 
the latter portion of the Tellini principle—“tak[ing] all reasonable 
measures for . . . the pursuit, arrest[,] and bringing to justice”—are still 
implicated. Thus, the fact that a Russian minor quite possibly wrote the 
virus that was used against Target should not necessarily bring 
responsibility upon Russia. However, the fact that Russia did not pursue 
the individual or bring him to justice could be used to show that the 
country should be held responsible for his actions. Thus, Russia should 
be held responsible for the Target case as well. 
Going forward, Russia should be subject to a higher level of 
responsibility than other States due to its history of allowing hackers to 
escape prosecution except when they target domestic institutions.215 The 
highly provocative suggestion that Russia has handshake agreements 
with hacking groups only further implicates Russia as being complicit in 
the attacks that are happening and increases the ability to hold it 
responsible for not responding to attacks emanating from within its 
borders. While every State has a responsibility to respond to requests 																																								 																					
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from other States regarding potential attacks that are emanating from 
within their borders, Russia’s history of malfeasance should increase the 
burden that Russia has in assisting the investigations of other nations 
regarding cyber-attacks perpetrated by Russian citizens. 
Even without the strong hint of an outright agreement between 
hackers, criminal groups, and the Russian government, Russia’s record 
of enforcement by itself seemingly implicates its responsibility. As 
discussed above, Russia has laws regulating intellectual property rights 
and cyber-crime, but it rarely enforces those laws and even more rarely 
doles out punishments that could possibly act as a deterrent given the 
lucrative rewards that flow to perpetrators of cyber activities.216 
There are, however, some potential problems with placing such a 
burden on Russia. Even determining that an attack is originating from 
Russia is not clear-cut. The relatively simple nature of some cyber-
attacks, such as denial of service attacks, makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, to conclusively find the source of the attack.217 The attacks 
can originate from any location and the source addresses assigned to the 
attacks can be falsified.218 Even if the message can be sourced correctly, 
the originating computer could be part of a botnet—the source computer 
might have been infected by a virus and might be controlled by another 
computer or individual in a different location.219 As a result, it is possible 
for States to frame an innocent State for an attack that did not originate 
from within its borders. 
Presumptively finding that Russia is the source of an attack could 
sour feelings between nations. Because of its past practices, it makes 
sense for hackers to mask their tracks through Russia to attempt to 
implicate Russia in future attacks. With the current degree of distrust 
between the West and Russia, a Western victim would likely take any 
opportunity to blame Russia for an attack. Again, however, it seems 
reasonable, given Russia’s history of tacit (or active) support of 
hackers220 and the greater physical access that Russia has to its own 
population, to require it to at least provide assistance to outside States 
when they have information implicating Russian citizens in the 
commission of attacks. 
Another troubling implication of assigning State responsibility for 
the actions of private citizens is the possibility of greater governmental 
control over the Internet, particularly in those locations where there is 
already significant government control. Encouraging Russia to engage in 
a more severe form of access or content control, given its significant 
stake in a variety of Internet companies already,221 may only serve to 
limit the ability of Russian citizens to access outside information. In 
addition, the significant disconnect between what Western nations want 
Russia to do and what Russian citizens expect—considering the current 
overall acceptance of hacking among the Russian population222—will 																																								 																					
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make it difficult at best for the government to start to more strictly 
enforce laws against behavior that the population does not find morally 
wrong. 
While there is not much recent precedent regarding holding a State 
responsible for not adequately preventing or responding to attacks of 
private individuals or groups, Russia seems like an ideal place to hold the 
State accountable. The fact that violations of intellectual property rights 
and cyber-crime often go unpunished implicates Russia as not having 
taken “reasonable measures” to prevent and prosecute the perpetrators of 
such acts, especially given its extraordinary strength in this area. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
There is a significant incentive for countries to allow hacker groups 
within their borders to attack foreign countries. As long as States are not 
held responsible for the actions of independent groups within their 
borders, they will not feel the need to control or mitigate the effects of 
these groups on outside nations. Furthermore, the relative imbalance of 
power between the attackers and the victims is evident. Targets can be 
chosen precisely, as evidenced in the Estonia and Georgia cases. 
Attributing the effects of those attacks cannot be done with anything 
even closely approximating the precision of the attacks. This asymmetry 
currently encourages States to do little to stop cyber acts emanating from 
within their borders because the negative effects are felt outside of the 
borders. On the other hand, preventing or mitigating the attacks would 
internalize the costs without necessarily providing any additional benefit. 
The current attribution rules as found in the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts are inadequate to enforce and maintain 
peace in an increasingly cyber-dominated world. A resurgence of the 
responsibility models of earlier case decisions will help States to be 
protected and have recourse for cyber attacks against them. This will be 
possible due to the capabilities of States to regulate the conduct of 
private citizens and groups within their borders. 
Based on Russia’s lax enforcement mechanisms of cyber-crime—
intellectual property related and in other areas—Russia should be held to 
a higher standard than other States. It is one thing for a rogue individual 
to attack an outside State. It is quite another for a State to ignore the 
actions of its citizens and to choose not to pursue them when it is aware 
of the damages that the citizens are causing outside of its borders. Russia 
should be held responsible for the actions of its citizens, especially when 
those actions are of a long duration or when Russia fails to stop the 
attacks or to prosecute those who engaged in them.
